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Abstract
We present TimeCrypt, an efficient and scalable system
that augments time series data stores with encrypted data
processing capabilities and features a new encryption-
based access control scheme that is additively homo-
morphic. TimeCrypt is tailored for time series work-
loads, supports fast statistical queries over large vol-
umes of encrypted time series data, and enables users to
cryptographically restrict the scope of queries and data
access based on pre-defined access policies. Our eval-
uation of TimeCrypt shows that its memory overhead
and performance are competitive and close to operating
on data in the clear (insecure). E.g., with data ingest
at 2.4 million data points per second, we experience a
slowdown of around 1.8% for both encrypted data in-
gest and statistical queries.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an explosive growth in devices
and services that automatically collect, aggregate, and
analyze time series data, and this trend is only expected
to accelerate with the proliferation of low-cost sensors
and the adoption of IoT. However, with this growth has
come mounting concern over protecting this data and the
privacy of users.
A key challenge in ensuring data privacy is that the
need for privacy co-exists with the desire to extract value
from the data and extracting value often implies granting
users and third-party services access to the data. For ex-
ample, many wearable devices now collect detailed per-
sonal health indicators which might be advantageously
shared with doctors, insurance companies, and family.
The most common approach deployed today has data
owners storing their data at trusted third-party providers
who can observe the data in the clear [16, 72]. How-
ever, the recurrence of incidents [9, 11, 12, 21, 24, 45] of
unauthorized sharing/selling of user data and the privacy
issues that arise from storing sensitive data remotely
has shown the need for solutions that conceal data from
cloud/storage providers while still benefitting from their
services. To address this need, many research efforts
are exploring an alternative approach in which data is
always stored encrypted and query processing is done
directly over encrypted data [50,51,53,62,69]. These ef-
forts, however, focus primarily on transactional [53] or
batch analytic workloads [50] rather than the time series
data we consider here. As a result, they do not provide
the necessary abstractions for effective stream analytics.
Additionally, supporting query processing over en-
crypted data is not in itself sufficient to protect data pri-
vacy. In many situations, it is unnecessary and/or unde-
sirable to give even authorized third-parties the ability
to query the data in an unfettered manner. Instead, users
may want to (i) share only aggregate statistics about the
data (e.g., avg/min/max vs. all values), (ii) limit the res-
olution at which such statistics are reported (e.g., hourly
vs. per-minute), (iii) limit the time interval over which
queries are issued (e.g., only June 2018), (v) or a com-
bination of the above. Moreover, the desired granularity
and scope of sharing can vary greatly across users and
applications. For example, a user might choose to simul-
taneously share hourly averages of their measured heart
rate with their doctor and per-minute averages with their
trainer but only for the duration of their workout session.
Similarly, a datacenter operator might share resource
utilization levels with a tenant but only for the duration
of her job. Hence support for encrypted query process-
ing must go hand-in-hand with access control that limits
the scope of data that users might query. Such access
control must be secure, flexible, and fine-grained: i.e.,
providing crypto-enforced control over not just who can
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
03
45
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 N
ov
 20
18
access a data stream, but also at what resolution, and
over what time interval. Equally important, the over-
head of the crypto primitives underlying access control
and encrypted data processing needs to be negligible to
meet the scaling, latency, and performance requirements
associated with time series data stores (§2).
There are two aspects to ensuring data confidentiality
and privacy while data is stored remotely: the first over-
sees the hosting providers (e.g., the cloud), which store
and process the data but cannot access data in the clear.
The second deals with authorized services (i.e., data
consumers), which are allowed to access the data but
only within a defined scope and granularity (in time and
resolution), to retain control over what can be inferred
from the data. Ensuring privacy, in this case, is a mat-
ter of supporting secure access control. These two as-
pects have traditionally been addressed independently:
the former through work on encrypted data process-
ing [3,35,50,53,63,65,69] and the latter through crypto-
enforced access control schemes [10,29,33,49,71]. The
challenge with time series data is that we must simul-
taneously support both: processing over encrypted data
streams and powerful access control, so that authorized
parties can issue queries on encrypted data but can only
decrypt results within the data scope they are authorized
to access. While one could achieve this by simply com-
bining solutions for each issue [36, 51, 62], we show
that current approaches scale poorly for time series data
(§6.2). Hence, we propose an alternative approach based
on a new unified encryption scheme that simultaneously
supports encrypted query processing and crypto-based
access control.
In this paper, we present TimeCrypt, the first sys-
tem that augments time series data stores with effi-
cient and privacy-preserving processing of time series
data, while providing cryptographic means to restrict
the query scope based on data owners policies. Par-
ticularly, we introduce a new encryption-based access
control scheme that is additively homomorphic. With
our encryption, data owners can cryptographically re-
strict user A to query encrypted data at a defined tempo-
ral range and granularity, while simultaneously allowing
user B to execute queries at a different granularity of the
same data without (i) introducing ciphertext expansion,
(ii) introducing any noticeable delays, or (iii) requiring
a trusted entity to facilitate this. Simultaneously achiev-
ing all three has never been realized before.
The crux of our Homomorphic Encryption-based Ac-
cess Control (HEAC) is time-encoded keys that are
derived from a novel construction (based on a key-
derivation tree and dual key-regression) which allows
selective sharing of keys and expressing powerful ac-
cess policies (i.e., temporal range and granularity). With
HEAC the server can efficiently process aggregation-
based statistical queries over encrypted data and access
control is cryptographically enforced at the client-side;
a client can only decrypt query results over data they
are authorized to access, i.e., true end-to-end encryp-
tion. TimeCrypt also supports queries that span multiple
streams, e.g., from multiple users. Similarly, a principal
can only decrypt the query result if she is granted access
to all streams involved in the inter-streams processing.
Contributions. In summary, our contributions are:
• Design and development of TimeCrypt, the first scal-
able private time series data store. TimeCrypt sup-
ports a rich set of analytics of relevance to time series
data: statistical analysis (e.g., sum, mean, variance,
min/max, frequency count), data compaction (e.g.,
archiving at lower resolutions), and range queries
over large volumes of encrypted time series data.
• A novel encryption-based access control scheme for
stream data that is additively homomorphic. It is the
first homomorphic scheme that cryptographically en-
forces access to desired data granularities.
• An open-source prototype1 and evaluation of Time-
Crypt showing its feasibility and competitive perfor-
mance. We prototype TimeCrypt on top of Cassandra
as the storage engine. We evaluate TimeCrypt with
two real-world applications, i.e., health and data cen-
ter monitoring. Considering a workload with 2.4 mil-
lion data point ingest per second on a single machine,
TimeCrypt’s throughput is only reduced by 1.8% for
both data ingest and statistical queries.
2 Time Series Data
Massive collection of time series data is increasingly
prevalent in a wide variety of scenarios [52, 58, 70].
To cope with the challenges that arise when process-
ing large volumes of time series data, numerous efforts
have focused on optimizing and designing dedicated
databases which offer significantly higher throughput
and scalability for their target workloads [4, 25, 37, 40,
43, 52, 67]. Such optimizations include employing sim-
plified data models [52] and building specialized in-
dices [4, 27] or precomputed aggregates [2, 4, 37] to ac-
celerate queries over high volumes of data. Time se-
ries databases have been the fastest growing category of
databases in the last two years [39, 56].
Time series data is a sequence of time-ordered data
points. Each point pi = (vi, ti) is associated with a value
1TimeCrypt code is available at https://timecrypt.io.
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and a unique timestamp capturing when the record was
reported. Time series data generally consists of consec-
utive measurements reported by the same source form-
ing a stream S = (p1, . . . , pn). A stream also includes
metadata such as data metric describing the data, e.g.,
heart rate, and data source describing the origin of data,
e.g., a unique device. Data points are typically generated
at an extremely high rate - high velocity, and are initially
stored at a high resolution - large volume [4,52]. It is not
unusual for applications in this space to report hundreds
of millions of data points per day [2, 4].
Primitives distinct to time series analytics are: (i) ac-
cess pattern: analytics is primarily carried over ranges
of streams, where data is accessed by specifying an ar-
bitrary time interval, i.e., a set of temporally co-located
data points rather than target point queries. (ii) aggrega-
tion and indexing: keeping computation tractable over
massive amounts of data necessitates fast stream pro-
cessing routines which are leveraged to identify frac-
tions of the data (less than %6 [6]) that are of interest for
more complex analytics. Hence, specialized indices to
accelerate statistical queries are essential in time series
databases [4, 37, 55]. (iii) compression and data decay:
time series data is often machine generated, continuous,
and massive. Hence, compression [52] and summariza-
tion techniques [2] are crucial for these systems.
Emerging time series databases primarily focus on
scaling performance and do not adequately address data
privacy. With TimeCrypt, we aim to fill this gap without
impairing their performance.
3 Overview
We discuss the challenges our system must address, give
an overview of TimeCrypt, and describe our security
model.
3.1 Challenges
To realize an encrypted time series data store that is ef-
ficient, scalable, and practical, we have to overcome im-
portant challenges with regards to the overhead of the
underlying cryptographic operations. This is of partic-
ular significance in our context due to the high velocity
and volume of time series data. The crypto primitives
employed by existing private databases [51, 53, 63, 69]
fall short in meeting the scalability and latency re-
quirements for time series data workloads, or lack in
the cryptographic means to restrict user’s access and
queries [50, 53, 63, 69]. Most of these systems employ
cryptographic primitives that incur considerable over-
head with regards to both computation (expensive op-
erations) and/or memory (ciphertext expansion). In the
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Figure 1: TimeCrypt’s architecture.
context of time series databases, the former impacts the
system’s responsiveness negatively (i.e., making it hard
to meet low-latency requirements) and the latter highly
inflates the memory consumption of an encrypted index
which negates the performance gains of in-memory pro-
cessing as less index data can fit into memory (§6.1).
Most private databases rely on a trusted third party
who manages and enforces access control. While sim-
ple, it implies that the trusted third party can access sen-
sitive data. Alternatively, a user can encrypt the tar-
get data for each principal. This approach is not scal-
able when considering fine-grained polices and leads
to memory redundancies, e.g., (re)encrypting the same
data repeatedly for different users. System’s that do em-
ploy crypto-enforced access control [36, 51, 62], how-
ever, similarly induce high memory and computation
overheads, which renders them impractical for our con-
text (§6.2). In this work we focus on addressing these
key challenges.
3.2 TimeCrypt
TimeCrypt builds on a conventional times series
database architecture [4, 37, 43], where a standard dis-
tributed key-value store is extended with additional
logic for time series workloads. TimeCrypt includes a
client-side engine to realize the end-to-end encryption
module paired with access control. In TimeCrypt, the
server can only see encrypted data, yet TimeCrypt incor-
porates a fast server-side query engine for aggregation-
based statistical queries and raw data access similar to
other plaintext time series databases [4].
TimeCrypt in a nutshell. TimeCrypt consists of
two components (i.e., the client and server engines) and
involves four parties (i.e., data owner, data producer,
data consumer, and the database server), as illustrated
in Fig. 1. Data producers are devices that generate and
upload time series data, such as wearables and IoT de-
vices. A data producer runs TimeCrypt’s client en-
gine which handles stream preprocessing (§4.1) and se-
curely storing (§4.2.2) the data on untrusted servers.
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Data consumers are entities (e.g., services) that are au-
thorized to access user’s data to provide added value,
such as visualizations, monitoring, and predictions.
Data consumers (i.e., principals) leverage TimeCrypt’s
client engine to send queries (§4.5). Data owners are
entities who own the data generated by data produc-
ing devices and can express flexible access permissions
to their data (§4.2.3). TimeCrypt executes statistical
queries directly on compressed and encrypted data. The
server engine builds and maintains private aggregate in-
dices over encrypted data streams for fast processing
of statistical queries (§4.5). Our encryption scheme
enables fast data processing and flexible and powerful
access control, while maintaining low query response
times (§4.2.2). TimeCrypt instances are stateless and
therefore horizontally scalable.
TimeCrypt crypto primitives. To enable encrypted
data processing that natively supports access control,
TimeCrypt introduces a stream-cipher-based encryption
scheme with additive homomorphic properties. An ad-
ditive homomorphic encryption scheme supports ad-
ditions on ciphertexts, such that decrypt(C1 ⊕C2) =
decrypt(C1)+ decrypt(C2). With this, we can support
statistical queries that are inherently aggregation-based
(e.g., sum, mean, frequency count) or can be trans-
formed to be aggregation-based (e.g., min/max) [22].
Since the encryption scheme is based on a stream cipher,
it relies on a keystream. A key aspect of our scheme
is tied to the observation that time series data streams
are continuous. Hence, we introduce a time-encoded
keystream that maps keys to temporal segments of the
data stream, such that a user can restrict access to the
data stream by only sharing the corresponding range in
the keystream with the principal (§4.3). Based on the
access policy, a user is acquainted with the necessary
decryption keys by means of access tokens. Access to-
kens are encrypted with the principal’s public key (hy-
brid encryption) and stored at the server’s key-store. To
enable sharing without enumerating all the keys, our en-
cryption scheme integrates a tree-based key derivation
function (§4.2.3). To grant a user access to only a de-
fined temporal resolution, e.g., aggregated values at the
full hour, we introduce an encoding scheme that allows
for efficient decryption of aggregated values (§4.2.2). In
§4.4, we discuss how we restrict access to a particular
resolution level and introduce an efficient key distribu-
tion mechanism based on dual key regression.
3.3 Security Model
Threat model. We assume the cloud storage to be
honest-but-curious, such that it follows the protocol
correctly, though trying to learn as much as possible
from the underlying data. This is a common trust
model [50, 53, 69], as the storage provider would face
economic repercussions in case of protocol violations.
We assume the existence of an identity provider, e.g.,
Keybase [42], for the public-key to identity mappings.
We assume data producers are honest and report correct
data and all secret keys are stored securely.
Security properties. TimeCrypt provides provable
data confidentiality and prevents unauthorized data ac-
cess. TimeCrypt embodies a crypto-enforced access
control that cryptographically restricts the temporal res-
olution and/or scope at which a principal can access the
data within one or multiple streams (i.e., issue statistical
queries). We formalize and prove the security guaran-
tees of TimeCrypt in §A.1. TimeCrypt supports access
revocation with forward secrecy, such that the revoked
user can no longer access new data. The revoked user
can, however, still access old data. Revoking access to
old data is, in general, a hard problem, as the revoked
user might have already cached the data locally. Time-
Crypt does not guarantee freshness, completeness, nor
correctness of the retrieved results. TimeCrypt can be
extended with frameworks, such as Verena [41], that
provide these guarantees. Finally, TimeCrypt does not
protect against access pattern-based inferences. Time-
Crypt can be complemented with Oblivious RAM ap-
proaches [57] to hide the access patterns.
4 TimeCrypt Design
In the following, we discuss TimeCrypt’s system com-
ponents and how they interplay to realize TimeCrypt.
4.1 Writing Stream Data
We now explain the data serialization process.
Chunking. We serialize and store time series data
in time-ordered blocks, referred to as chunks, which
contain batches of consecutive data points. Batch-
ing/chunking is a common technique in time series
databases [34, 43, 73]. It provides positive perfor-
mance gains as time series analytics predominantly in-
volves processing of sequences of in time co-located
data points, rather than individual points [34].
Chunk digest. Each data chunk includes an encrypted
digest that contains aggregate statistics over its corre-
sponding chunk data (e.g., sum, count, min, max, fre-
quency count, etc.). The content of a digest is pre-
configured based on the statistical queries to be sup-
ported per stream. TimeCrypt supports common statisti-
cal queries by default. The digest is encrypted with our
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encryption scheme HEAC that is additively homomor-
phic. The data points per chunk are compressed2 and
encrypted with a randomized encryption scheme (AES-
GCM-128). Next, we describe our encryption scheme,
and how encryption keys are generated and managed for
both chunk digest and chunk data encryption to enable
flexible secure access control.
4.2 TimeCrypt’s Encryption
We start this section by giving an intuition about the
underlying symmetric-key homomorphic encryption we
employ in TimeCrypt.
4.2.1 Symmetric-key Homomorphic Encryption
Our scheme builds on Castelluccia’s encryption [19].
Castelluccia’s encryption in its essence is similar to a
stream cipher, where one-time keys are combined with
the plaintext data block for encryption. As in tradi-
tional stream ciphers, the scheme makes the assump-
tion that the client is in possession of a pseudorandom
keystream {k0,k1,k2...} for encryption and decryption.
To encrypt an integer mi ∈ [0,M− 1] we select a ran-
dom key ki ∈ [0,M − 1] and compute the ciphertext:
ci = Encki(mi) = mi + ki mod M. For decryption, ac-
cess to the random key ki is required: mi = Decki(ci) =
mi+ ki− ki mod M.
This scheme is information-theoretically secure, as
long as the keys are pseudorandom and no key is
reused [18]. Since we use modular addition as the en-
cryption function, the scheme is also additively homo-
morphic and requires access to the aggregated secret
keys to decrypt an aggregated ciphertext:
Dec∑ni=0 ki(
n
∑
i=0
ci) =
n
∑
i=0
mi+
n
∑
i=0
ki−
n
∑
i=0
ki mod M (1)
After decrypting the aggregated ciphertext, we gain
access to the aggregated plaintext value. Note that sim-
ilar to operating on plaintext, there will be an overflow
(in this case modulo M), if the aggregated values grow
larger than M. Hence, the ciphertext size in the scheme
is limited by M and the homomorphic additions are ex-
tremely efficient, as they correspond to modular addi-
tions. In TimeCrypt, we set M to 264, such that we can
support all integer sizes, without leaking any informa-
tion about their original size.
2TimeCrypt runs the compression algorithm that yields the best
results for the underlying data. For instance, delta encoding might
be highly effective for low precision data with many identical values,
but less effective for high precision data with large deltas. TimeCrypt
supports various lossless compression techniques, with zlib as default.
The drawback of this approach is that the client needs
to aggregate all the keys to decrypt each aggregated ci-
phertext. If the server aggregates one million different
ciphertexts, the client has to add one million keys for
decryption, which is highly inefficient and not scalable.
In TimeCrypt, we utilize the characteristics of time
series data to overcome this problem. Our Homomor-
phic Encryption-based Access Control scheme (HEAC)
employs a key canceling technique for reducing the
number of key additions during decryption (§4.2.2) and
comprises an efficient key generation construction that
embodies the access control capabilities (§4.2.3).
4.2.2 Key Canceling
To reduce the number of key aggregations for decryp-
tion of aggregated ciphertexts, we leverage the fact that
time series data is aggregated in-range (i.e., over a con-
tiguous range in time). The idea is that instead of just
adding a key k j to message m j, we construct the key as
k j− k j+1. In other words, we select the individual keys,
such that during aggregation the inner keys cancel each
other out, and only the outer keys at the beginning and
end are needed for decryption. We employ the following
encoding scheme for encryption:
Enck′i(mi) = mi+ k
′
i mod M, with k
′
i = ki− ki+1 (2)
For decryption, access to ki and ki+1 is required:
mi = Deck′i(ci) = mi+ k
′
i− k′i mod M (3)
The advantage of this key encoding becomes relevant
while decrypting an in-range aggregated ciphertext. The
resulting aggregated key consists of only two keys as the
other keys are canceling out:
n
∑
i=0
k′i = (k0− k1 )+( k1 − k2 ) . . .( kn − kn+1) (4)
The encoding renders the decryption in TimeCrypt in-
dependent of the number of in-range aggregated cipher-
texts. An encoding that cancels out keys during aggre-
gation was introduced by Castelluccia et al. [1] and was
adopted in other systems [14, 50]. However, Castelluc-
cia’s encryption does not lend itself to access control as
we discuss next.
4.2.3 Key Generation with Access Control
Prior work. Castelluccia et al. [18] propose lever-
aging a pseudorandom function (PRF) (§A.1.1) with an
initially exchanged secret key, to generate the keystream
{k0,k1,k2, ...}. Other systems [1, 14, 50] adopt this ap-
proach and use a PRF F(k, i) (e.g., a hash function or
5
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Figure 2: TimeCrypt’s key derivation tree. The leaf nodes
form the keystream.
a block cipher) to generate the i-th encryption key based
on a secret key k. While this addresses the challenge
of handling a large number of keys, it exhibits the all-
or-nothing sharing principle, as with access to the secret
key k one can compute all keys. Hence, it lacks support
for proper access control needed in the context of our
target applications.
Ours. To enable a fine-grained access control that al-
lows data owners to cryptographically enforce the scope
of access to their data, we design a novel key construc-
tion scheme based on key derivation trees. A key deriva-
tion tree is a balanced binary tree where each node con-
tains a unique pseudorandom string. The key derivation
tree is built top-down from a secret random seed as the
root. The child nodes are generated with a pseudoran-
dom generator (PRG) - formally defined in §A.1.1 - that
takes the parent as the input. Our PRG consists of G0(x)
for the left child and G1(x) for the right child, where
x is the parent node. This procedure is applied recur-
sively until the desired depth h in the tree is reached. The
leaf nodes represent the keystream {k0,k1,k2, ...,k2h−1}
as depicted in Fig. 2. We select a large h such that the
keystream is virtually infinite.
In TimeCrypt, the pseudorandom generator can be
realized with hash functions G0(x) = H(0||x),G1(x) =
H(1||x) or block ciphers G0(x) = Bx(0),G1(x) = Bx(1)
with x as the key. In §6.2, we discuss the trade-offs of
different PRGs and why AES-NI is the best candidate in
terms of performance. For a formal treatment and secu-
rity proofs of our key derivation tree, we refer to §A.1.3.
Sharing. The key derivation tree allows us to share
segments of the keystream efficiently. Instead of shar-
ing the segment key-by-key, the client shares a few inner
nodes, which we refer to as access tokens. A principal,
who is in possession of these tokens, can derive the keys
in the segment by computing the subtrees of each token,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. Therefore, for sharing a segment
in the keystream the client has to send at most h access
tokens instead of the the individual keys, e.g., in Fig. 2’s
toy example, we share eight keys with a single access
token. In practice a single token could be used to share
thousands of keys. Note that given a token it is com-
putationally not feasible (i.e., due to one-way property
of PRGs) to compute the parent, sibling, or any of the
ancestor nodes. Hence, a principal cannot compute any
keys outside the segment they are granted access to.
4.3 Time-Encoded Keystream
The tree key derivation allows us to efficiently restrict
access to segments of keys. However, in TimeCrypt, we
need to restrict access based on temporal ranges, e.g.,
Fri-Sep-14-14:00 till Mo-17-06:00 2018. To enable this
in HEAC, we associate each key to a fixed time window.
By mapping keys to temporal ranges, a time range im-
plicitly determines the position of the used key in the
keystream. Hence, we do not need to store identifiers of
the keys along with the ciphertexts and can avoid cipher-
text expansion which other systems suffer from [50].
TimeCrypt’s data chunking is carried out at fixed
time intervals of size ∆ per stream (e.g., 10 s intervals)
and each chunk is encrypted with a fresh key from the
keystream. Keep in mind that each chunk contains in ad-
dition to raw data points a digest that is relevant for the
statistical processing (§4.1). Assuming the data stream
starts at timestamp t0, the chunk digest mi for the in-
terval [ti, ti+1) (∆ = ti+1 − ti) is encrypted with HEAC
as ci = mi + ki− ki+1, while the corresponding chunk is
simply encrypted with AES GCM using the key com-
puted as H(ki − ki+1). For example, when the data
owner grants access to the stream from t0 to t7 (i.e.,
[t0, t7)) the data owner shares the access token from the
key derivation tree that corresponds to the key segment
{k0, . . . ,k7}, as illustrated in Fig. 2. With these keys
the principal can decrypt all queries associated with data
within the time range [t0, t7).
The fixed time interval size ∆ is an application pa-
rameter in TimeCrypt that can vary between streams
and defines the smallest interval for server-side data
processing. Due to the additively homomorphic prop-
erty of HEAC, TimeCrypt computes data aggregates that
are a multitude of ∆. TimeCrypt additionally supports
inter-streams queries, regardless of the individual stream
chunk sizes. Only the principal who is granted access
to the corresponding streams can decrypt the result of
inter-streams queries.
4.4 Resolution-based Access Restriction
We now discuss how TimeCrypt provides crypto-
enforced access control over the resolution at which data
can be queried; i.e., where the data owner not only re-
stricts access to a time range per principal but also de-
fines the temporal granularity (e.g., per minute, hour,
6
time
Keystream {k0, …, kn}
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RK (Resolution Keys)
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Dual key regression (R1)
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shared tokens derived keys enc (ki)RKj dec (enc (ki))RKjRKj
Figure 3: Dual-key-regression for access at different data
granularities. E.g., R0 gives per-chunk access, R1 and R2 are
restricted to aggregated data at 3x and 6x chunk granularities.
etc.) at which the principals can retrieve/query data.
Multi-resolution data support is crucial for approximate
queries, visualization, and time series analytics that op-
erate on higher representation of the data to keep the
analysis computationally tractable [2]. Aside from be-
ing important for time series analytics, serving data at
different granularities is of ample relevance for privacy.
Restricting access to only the necessary data resolutions
provides a higher degree of privacy protection, prevent-
ing inference of sensitive information from high resolu-
tion data [22].
4.4.1 Outer Key Sharing
To enable crypto-enforced resolution access in Time-
Crypt, we leverage the fact that inner keys cancel out
during in-range aggregations, as described in §4.2.2. In
general, an in-range aggregated ciphertext over the time
period [ti, t j) has the form ∑ j−1x=i cx = ∑
j−1
x=i mx + ki− k j
where the inner keys are canceled out. Hence, with only
access to the keys ki and k j, one can only decrypt this
aggregation ∑ j−1x=i mx, i.e., restricted access. As an ex-
ample, if the owner wants to restrict access to 6-fold
aggregations (∑6x=0 mx,∑
12
x=6 mx,∑
18
x=12 mx, ...) the owner
only shares the outer keys {k0,k6,k12, ...} with the prin-
cipal. The principal can decrypt the aggregated cipher-
texts only at the 6-fold granularity (e.g., 6x ∆) or lower
resolutions, but not higher resolutions since the inner
keys are missing. Note that the chunk interval ∆ de-
fines the highest resolution, and lower resolutions are a
multitude of ∆. For instance, we set ∆ to 10 s in the
health application and hence can define access resolu-
tions as a multitude of 10 s (e.g., 1-min aggregates in
the example above). Resolutions are aligned at times-
tamps and cannot be shifted arbitrarily. For instance,
per-minute resolution means only aggregated data at the
full minute. Otherwise one could compute the differ-
ence of two aggregates shifted by ∆ and disclose data at
the chunk resolution.
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Figure 4: A statistical index for time series data with a k-
ary time-partitioned aggregation tree. The pre-computed index
allows for fast response times for statistical queries.
4.4.2 Efficient Key Distribution
The Outer Key Sharing technique (§4.4.1) requires shar-
ing keys from the keystream that are not contigu-
ous (e.g., only every 6th key instead of every key in
the time segment) which cannot be realized efficiently
via our tree structure. To overcome the hurdle of
key distribution in the case of resolution-based access,
TimeCrypt generates a new keystream {k¯0, k¯1, k¯2, ...}
per access resolution, for efficient segment-wise ac-
cess to the outer keys (i.e., resolution keys). For ex-
ample, if a client wants to support a per-minute res-
olution for 10 s data chunks, the client encrypts the
outer keys {k0,k6,k12, ...} with the resolution keystream
{enck¯0(k0),enck¯1(k6),enck¯2(k12), ...} and stores the re-
sulting key envelopes on the server. A principal with
access to the resolution keystream can download the en-
velopes and gain access to the respective outer keys.
To enable efficient and flexible sharing of the resolu-
tion keystream, we employ dual key regression, as in-
troduced in our prior work [61]. Dual key regression
is a special construction based on hash chains, it sup-
ports efficient enumeration of keys within a bounded in-
terval, such that given two tokens hl and hu with l < u,
one can only compute the keys ki with i ∈ [l,u]. Hash
chains have the property that they can be computed ef-
ficiently in one direction, but it is computationally in-
feasible to compute the reverse, due to the preimage re-
sistance property of cryptographic hash functions. Dual
key regression employs two hash chains (primary and
secondary) where the key derivation function takes two
tokens; one token from each chain. The secondary chain
is consumed in the reverse order of the primary chain
allowing to set start and end boundaries on the shared
interval, as depicted in Fig. 3. We refer to §A.2 for a
formal description of dual key regression.
In TimeCrypt, a user does not need to decide a-priori
on a fixed resolution for data consumers and can dy-
namically at any point in time define a new resolu-
tion, i.e., creating a new dual key regression, as illus-
trated in Fig. 3. E.g., Alice can share her health data
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Functions Description
(1) CreateStream(uuid, [config]) Create a new stream, config defines parameters, e.g., compression, chunk interval, operators.
(2) DeleteStream(uuid) Delete specified stream with all associated data.
(3) RollupStream(uuid, res, [Ts, Te]) Rollup an existing stream or a segment of it to the specified temporal resolution.
(4) InsertRecord(uuid, [t, val]) Serialize data points in a chunk and append to the end of the stream.
(5) GetRange(uuid, Ts, Te) Retrieve all data records within the specified time interval.
(6) GetStatRange([uuid], Ts, Te, [operators]) Retrieve statistics for the given time interval, default [sum, count, mean, var, freq, min/max].
(7) DeleteRange(uuid, start, end) Delete specified segment of the stream, while maintaining per-chunk digest.
(8) GrantAccess(uuid, principal-id, start, end, res) Grant access to a principal at the specified resolution for the specified time interval.
(9) GrantOpenAccess(uuid, principal-id, start, res) Grant open-ended subscription, i.e., access granted until revoked.
(10) RevokeAccess(uuid, principal-id, end) Revoke access of a principal starting from the specified end time.
Table 1: TimeCrypt’s basic API.
with a physician at minute-level (high-resolution) dur-
ing physiotherapy from Jan-to-Feb, and from March
reduce the resolution to hourly (low-resolution). The
physician only sees high-resolution data for Jan-Feb and
only hourly-data from March onwards. In §6.2, we dis-
cuss the performance of resolution-based access control.
4.5 Encrypted Index
We now discuss the indexing structure we employ to
process statistical queries over billions of encrypted data
records and describe the statistical queries we support.
Time series indexing. TimeCrypt builds a time-
partitioned aggregation tree [4] over encrypted data at
the server side. This forms the base for an index struc-
ture that makes it possible to execute fast queries over
a large sequence of encrypted data and enables fast and
efficient data retention. The index structure is a k-ary
tree, where each node contains k statistical summaries
referred to as digest. Each digest represents a statisti-
cal summary over a time interval in the time series. The
server builds the tree bottom-up, where the leaf nodes
contain the digest of each chunk. A digest in the par-
ent node is computed as the aggregation of all digests
of the child nodes. Therefore, the parent node repre-
sents the statistical summary spanning over the whole
time interval of its subtree, as depicted in Fig. 4. The
encrypted index enables the server to significantly de-
crease the computation time of statistical range queries,
as we avoid expensive serial scans and minimize on-the-
fly computations. The server builds the index from the
digests that are encrypted with HEAC. Since time series
workloads are in-order append-only, updating the tree
is straightforward for the server. Note that only the rele-
vant segments of the tree are loaded into memory, which
is important in case the tree grows too large.
Data decay. As time series data ages, it is often aggre-
gated into lower resolutions for long-term retention of
historical data. Typical strategies for collapsing multi-
ple data points for roll-up to a lower precision are based
on aggregation-based summarization. Depending on the
application, high-resolution data can be aged-out after
a defined retention period. TimeCrypt natively supports
downsampling and archiving at lower resolutions, e.g.,
strategies for pruning of the index at a fixed resolution.
Statistical queries. TimeCrypt supports a set of com-
mon statistical queries in time series databases which are
essential for identifying and searching for data segments
that are relevant for further complex analytics. The per-
chunk digest holds a vector of values {x0, ...,xn} that are
encrypted with HEAC. TimeCrypt computes an aggre-
gate function f (x0, ...,xn) to serve the statistical queries.
To evaluate linear computations such as SUM,
COUNT, and MEAN the vector in the digest contains en-
crypted sum and count for data points in the chunk, and
MEAN is computed based on SUM and COUNT. For
quadratic functions, e.g., VAR and STDEV, the vector
stores squares of sums per chunk. For computing HIS-
TOGRAM the bin boundaries per chunk simply track the
encrypted count per bin and the final result delivers the
aggregate counts for each count per bin.
We compute MIN/MAX values via the HISTOGRAM
function. Hence, in addition to providing the MIN/MAX
values, we also gain information about their frequency
count. Note that since the MIN/MAX function does
not rely on order-revealing encryption it does not suf-
fer from leakage [47]. The set of supported statistical
queries can be extended with further aggregation-based
functions, e.g., aggregation-based encodings that allow
private training of linear machine learning models [22].
4.6 TimeCrypt Integration
In this section, we briefly describe TimeCrypt’s API,
and storage and integration aspects of TimeCrypt.
API. TimeCrypt is realized as a service which ex-
poses an interface similar to conventional time series
stores; applications can insert encrypted data, retrieve
encrypted data by specifying an arbitrary time range,
and process statistical queries over arbitrary ranges of
encrypted data, as summarized in Table 1. In Time-
Crypt, each stream is identified by a unique UUID and
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System Micro Index - Size Average Ingest Time Average Query Time (worst-case)
ADD 1M 1k 1M 100M 1k 1M 100M
Paillier 2.1µs 780MB (96x) 37ms (6167x) 42ms (3500x) N/A 22ms (1692x) 37ms (1028x) N/A
EC-ElGamal 0.7ms 168MB (21x) 27ms (4500x) 43ms (3583x) N/A 66ms (5077x) 185ms (5139x) N/A
TimeCrypt 1ns 8.1MB (1x) 16µs (1.8x) 18µs (1.3x) 22µs (1.3x) 21µs (1.6x) 46µs (1.3x) 50µs (1.1x)
Plaintext 1ns 8.1MB (1x) 6µs (1x) 12µs (1x) 17µs (1x) 13µs (1x) 36µs (1x) 45µs (1x)
Table 2: Overview of our evaluation results on cloud, with 128-bit security, except for the plaintext. The largest index size with
100M chunks (representing over 50 billion data points in our health app) is omitted for the strawman due to excessive overheads.
associated stream metadata, e.g., hostname, data type,
sensor ID, location. Each stream has one writer (i.e.,
data producer) and one or multiple readers (i.e., princi-
pals). A data owner can grant and revoke read access to
a principal at the desired temporal resolution.
Storage model. TimeCrypt can be plugged-in with any
scalable key-value store for persisting data chunks and
statistical indices. For each incoming chunk, the server
engine loads the relevant index nodes and updates the in-
dex accordingly. The index nodes and chunks are stored
under a unique identifier, which consists of the stream
identifier and the encoding of the time interval that they
represent. We compute the identifier of a node/chunk
on-the-fly without storing any references, based on the
temporal range boundaries.
Client-side batching. To meet the performance and
end-to-end encryption requirements, the client takes an
active role in TimeCrypt. The client feeds encrypted
data chunks and digests to the server. Chunking at
the client-side induces a latency that is bound by the
chunk interval. This latency can be eradicated with-
out breaking the encryption, by instantly uploading en-
crypted data records in real-time to the datastore and
dropping the encrypted records once the corresponding
chunk is stored. The required efforts to integrate Time-
Crypt in existing databases varies largely on the inter-
nals of the target database. However, an integration is
straight-forward for databases that leverage key-value
storage. Our prototype is interfaced with Cassandra –
a distributed key-value storage. This resembles a com-
mon design of current time series databases [25, 37, 52]
and allows for modular development and independent
performance quantification.
5 Implementation
We built a prototype of TimeCrypt in Java. The server
library consists of a network interface implemented with
Netty [38], which provides TimeCrypt’s API. The server
and client communicate over Google’s protobufs [31]
protocol. The server engine includes the implementa-
tion of the k-ary tree logic and an interface to the un-
derlying distributed storage, i.e., Cassandra [17]. We
TimeCrypt Paillier EC-ElGamal
[Enc] [Dec] [Enc] [Dec] [Enc] [Dec]
IoT 1.08ms 1.08ms 1.59s 1.62s 252ms N/A
Laptop 5.08µs 5.08µs 30 ms 15ms 1.4ms 1.1ms
Table 3: Performance of crypto operations with at least 80-
bit security and 32-bit integers on IoT devices (OpenMote) vs.
laptops (Macbook). TimeCrypt uses a hash tree with 230 keys.
employ an LRU cache for the index nodes using caf-
feine [44]. The client engine contains the data serializa-
tion module, which compresses (i.e., default zlib) and
encrypts chunks with AES-GCM. For the crypto opera-
tions, we use the Java security provider and a native C
implementation of AES-NI. The query module imple-
ments the statistical query interface and a standard data
retrieval interface. A user can query and access data
only if she is granted the corresponding access permis-
sions. The client and server consist of 850 and 5600
sloc, respectively.
To compare TimeCrypt to the strawman, our im-
plementation integrates the crypto primitives for index
computation based on Paillier [66] (based on Java Big-
Integers) and EC-ElGamal (based on OpenSSL [48]).
6 Evaluation
We now present the evaluation results of TimeCrypt.
The evaluation is designed to answer two questions;
(i) can TimeCrypt meet the performance requirements of
time series workloads - by showing to which extent we
narrow the performance gap of TimeCrypt compared to
operating on plaintext data, and (ii) what are the perfor-
mance gains of TimeCrypt relative to a strawman con-
struction (representing encrypted databases [53,63,69]).
After elaborating on our evaluation setup, we discuss
the results of the microbenchmark of the system compo-
nents (§6.1 and §6.2). Then we present the results of the
end-to-end (E2E) system evaluation considering work-
loads of a health monitoring (mhealth) and data center
monitoring (DevOps) applications (§6.3).
Setup and metrics. Our experiments are conducted
with Amazon Web Service (AWS) M5 instances, each
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Figure 5: Aggregate queries over varying interval sizes. Ag-
gregating the entire index corresponds to retrieving and de-
crypting the root. For the strawman constructions the index
size is capped at 220 due to excessive construction overhead.
equipped with a 2.5 GHz Intel Xeon processor, running
Ubuntu (16.04 LTS). We run TimeCrypt’s server nodes
on m5.2xlarge instances with 8 virtual processor cores
and 32 GB RAM. The clients are simulated on several
m5.xlarge instances each with 4 virtual processor cores
and 16 GB RAM. The client and server are connected
to the same datacenter network, with up to 10 Gbps
bandwidth. For the microbenchmark, we include IoT
OpenMotes which are equipped with 32-bit ARM M3
SoC 32 MHz and a 250 MHz crypto accelerator (Fitbit
trackers utilize a similar class of microcontrollers) and a
MacBook Pro 2.8 GHz Intel Core i7, with 16 GB RAM.
For all our experiments, we use the same system ar-
chitecture. We quantify the overhead of TimeCrypt,
compare it to the plaintext setting operating over data in
the clear, i.e., 64-bit unencrypted values, and strawman
where we consider two alternative encryption schemes
for the digest, i.e., Paillier and EC-ElGamal. For fair-
ness, in all settings, the system operates with com-
pressed data chunks. For TimeCrypt and strawman, we
use 128-bit security [7]. This corresponds to 3072-bit
keys for Paillier and a 256-bit elliptic curve for EC-
ElGamal (i.e., prime256v1 in OpenSSL).
In the microbenchmarks, we consider the latency of
index updates and query processing without accounting
for network delay. In all experiments, we instantiate 64-
ary index trees and a keystream with one billion keys via
the key derivation tree.
For the E2E system benchmark, we use workloads of
an mhealth and a DevOps application. For the mhealth,
we consider a health monitoring wearable [13], which
collects 12 different metrics at 50 Hz, where we set the
chunk length to 10 s holding up to 500 data points. In the
DevOps scenario, we utilize a synthesized CPU moni-
toring workload generated by the time series benchmark
suite [68] with 10 metrics, 100 hosts, 10 s data rate and
a one-min chunk size ∆. For both, we generate the load
on a machine with 100 threads, where each thread con-
stantly performs four statistical queries after each chunk
ingest for the experiment duration of half an hour ex-
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Figure 6: Performance of different hash functions for the hash
tree (AES-NI as default). The computation of a single key
corresponds to log(n) hashes, with n keys (i.e., leaf nodes).
cluding warm-up and cool-down phases. On the server
side, we run a Cassandra and a TimeCrypt instance on
the same machine for the mhealth app and separate them
in the DevOps scenario. The network latency between
the client and server is about 0.6 ms.
6.1 Index Performance
We discuss the evaluation results of different aspects
of the index, as summarized in Table 2. In the micro-
benchmark, the index supports one statistical operation
(i.e., sum) for isolated overhead quantification, whereas
in the E2E benchmark the index supports more queries.
Size. The in-memory index is essential for fast statisti-
cal queries. As system memory is limited and generally
smaller than available data, it is crucial to the system
performance to keep the index-size small. The encryp-
tion schemes in the strawman exhibit large ciphertext
expansion, for instance for one million chunks we ex-
perience 96x index size expansion with Paillier. Time-
Crypt has no ciphertext expansion for 64-bit values.
Ingest time. On each ingest, the index nodes are
updated by computing aggregates of the child nodes.
The costs for updates are relatively high for both EC-
Elgamal and Paillier, i.e., more than 3500x slower than
plaintext. With Paillier this is due to the high encryp-
tion cost, while in EC-ElGamal the cost of elliptic curve
additions dominates the average ingest time. In Time-
Crypt, additions are as efficient as in plaintext. Hence,
the average ingest time increases slightly due to the en-
cryption cost; 1.3x for a large index, outperforming the
strawman constructions by three orders of magnitudes.
Query performance. Fig. 5 shows the performance
of the index for statistical range queries of different
lengths, i.e., [0,2x] with x ∈ [0..26]. As the length of
queries increases fewer tree levels are traversed, which
results in fewer cache fetches and lower computation
time, e.g., the index depth of five is observable in Fig. 5.
For plaintext and TimeCrypt the resulting pattern is sim-
ilar due to the low cost of additions, while for Time-
Crypt the decryption overhead is visible. The strawman
encryptions have higher addition costs, which results in
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Figure 7: Latency and throughput for ingest and statistical queries for TimeCrypt vs. strawman and operating on plaintext indices.
Heavy load experiment with a read-write ratio of 4 to 1, and additionally with extremely small (S) index cache (1 MB). The AWS
load generator creates 1200 streams with 100 clients, corresponding to 48579 streams in our health app (∆:10s, 50Hz data rate).
the distinct sawtooth pattern due to on-the-fly aggrega-
tions within index nodes.
Queries with non-power-of-k ranges require an index
drill down on either end of the range. This increases
the computation time logarithmic, O(2(k-1)logk(n)) for
a worst-case alignment, and not linear to the n stored
chunks. Similar to ingest, TimeCrypt performs statisti-
cal queries with a latency close to the plaintext (i.e., only
1.1x) and outperforms the strawman significantly.
6.2 Client Performance
Crypto primitives. Table 3 summarizes the encryption
and decryption costs for TimeCrypt. TimeCrypt’s en-
cryption scheme requires two key derivations. By lever-
aging hardware AES instructions (AES-NI), the deriva-
tion cost is reduced to 2.5 µs for a hash tree with 230
keys, as shown in Fig. 6. Hence, encryption and de-
cryption in TimeCrypt amount to 5.08 µs, which out-
performs the strawman by several orders of magnitude.
Access control. To compare TimeCrypt’s crypto-based
data access to related approaches, such as Attribute-
based Encryption (ABE), we consider it in isolation, as
ABE-based systems, e.g., Sieve [71], do not support en-
crypted data processing. To enable granular access at
the level of chunks, the ABE scheme takes the chunk
counter as an attribute. To grant access to a given range,
the attributes of the principal’s key are set to this range.
To realize resolution access, the client or a trusted proxy
can download and compute the aggregates, which are
protected with the corresponding attribute. This results
in an overhead of 53 ms per chunk (80-bit security), con-
sidering only one attribute. The overhead is expected to
increase linearly with more attributes. TimeCrypt com-
putes a keystream via the tree-based key derivation, and
a resolution keystream via dual-key-regression. Consid-
ering zero caching for the worst-case computation time,
the former has an upper bound of log(n) hash com-
putations with n keys, i.e., 2.5 µs for a tree with 230
keys. The later amounts to an iteration with the dual key
regression which has an upper bound of O(
√
n) for n
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Figure 8: Latency for statistical queries of one month data in
our health app (121M records). The x-axis shows the granu-
larity of the requested data from one minute to one month.
nodes in the key regression. This amounts to 2.7 ms for
a key regression with the highest resolution matching
the 230 keys. To decrypt, ABE requires 13 ms per chunk
whereas TimeCrypt only requires one addition and one
subtraction (i.e., 2 ns). Consequently, TimeCrypt out-
performs ABE significantly. Note that for fairness, we
assume both TimeCrypt and the ABE-based system to
have the same key distribution mechanisms in place.
6.3 End-to-End System Performance
In the following, we quantify the E2E overhead for the
health and DevOps applications.
mHealth Performance. The plaintext setting reaches
a throughput of 2.47M records/s for ingest and 19.4k
ops/s for statistical queries, as shown in Fig. 7a-b. Time-
Crypt demonstrates an outstanding throughput for both
ingest and statistical queries with only 1.8% slowdown
compared to plaintext. TimeCrypt is by 20x and 52x
faster than EC-ElGamal and Paillier in the strawman.
With regards to latency, TimeCrypt outperforms the
strawman by two orders of magnitude and approaches
the latency of plaintext (Fig. 7c-d). The impact of a
small index cache (1 MB) is distinct, but similar for both
plaintext and TimeCrypt, due to higher cache misses.
mHealth Views. Our mhealth app shows different ag-
gregation plots of last month’s data (121 M data points).
We also consider the extreme case of plotting one-month
data at minute granularity (403 MB plot), which induces
an overhead of 1.51x in latency compared to plaintext,
as shown in Fig. 8. This is due to the high number of de-
cryptions of the individually retrieved aggregates (i.e.,
11
40320). With higher granularities, the overhead sharply
decreases and reaches 1.01x for one month.
DevOps Performance. In the DevOps app, we con-
sider a data center CPU monitoring workload, where
the clients query the sever for average CPU utilization
and percentage of machines with higher than 50% uti-
lization, within up to 16 h intervals. The load is similar
to mhealth but with smaller chunks, i.e., 6 records per
chunk. With plaintext, we observe an ingest through-
put of 60.6k records/s and a query throughput of 40.4k
ops/s. TimeCrypt matches the plaintext performance,
with only 0.75% slowdown.
7 Discussion and Limitations
We highlight some research questions that remain open.
Richer statistics. TimeCrypt is optimized for statis-
tical range queries on encrypted time series data, the
most common queries over such data (§2). Analyzing
raw streams in their entirety is generally impractical if
not infeasible [6]. TimeCrypt provides powerful tools
to search and retrieve relevant segments of the stream
that can then be subject to advanced client-side process-
ing after decryption. Data mining and advanced queries,
e.g., series similarity, distance measures, predictions,
and pattern detection are currently not supported on en-
crypted data. These are naturally more complex to pro-
cess, and require specialized data structures and algo-
rithms to be performed efficiently over big data [27].
Performance. TimeCrypt’s encryption scheme con-
sists of the key management that delivers one-time keys.
Our encryption is optimized for continuous aggregation
segments and suffers from alternative patterns, such as
aggregating every second data chunk. Here the decryp-
tion overhead grows linearly with the number of aggre-
gations and is not bound by a constant factor.
8 Related Work
Privacy-preserving aggregation. TimeCrypt’s en-
cryption scheme HEAC builds on Castelluccia’s en-
cryption [18, 19], which has been adopted in several
works [14,50,64]. Seabed [50] is a secure analytics sys-
tem that similarly builds on Castelluccia for secure ag-
gregation. However, Seabed is designed for Spark-like
batch processing workloads without the tight latency re-
quirements of time series data3 Moreover, they oper-
ate within a single-user model, i.e., do not provide the
fine-grained access control that is our focus. PSA [64]
3E.g., Seabed requires seconds to process an aggregate query over
one billion data records with 100 cores [50], whereas TimeCrypt can
process such a query within few milliseconds on a single machine.
and Prio [22] tackle the problem of secure aggregation,
where the aggregator only learns the result of the aggre-
gation but not the individual values. In TimeCrypt, the
server does not learn the result of a query.
Encrypted databases are designed mainly for transac-
tional [36, 53, 62, 69] and analytics workloads [50, 69].
Hence, they neither provide the necessary primitives
for stream analytics nor support crypto-enforced fine-
grained access. E.g., CryptDB [53] has high compu-
tation load and large memory expansion. ENKI [36]
and Pilatus [62] support sharing and encrypted compu-
tations, but lack fine-grained access control, and suffer
similarly from high overheads. Bolt [34] is an encrypted
data storage system for time series data that supports re-
trieval of encrypted chunks but has no server-side query
support. BlindSeer [51] enables private boolean search
queries over an encrypted database by building an index
with Yao’s garbled circuits, but does not support statis-
tical queries. It integrates access control for the search
queries, but requires two non-colluding parties.
Crypto-based access is explored by crypto-systems
[29] such as identity-based encryption, ABE, predicate
encryption, and functional encryption. ABE [10, 32, 33,
49, 59] is the most expressive among them, though it
comes with limitations with respect to revocation, fine-
grained access, and dynamic updates [29]. Sieve [71]
combines ABE with key-homomorphic encryption, to
enable revocation on a non-colluding cloud. ABE-based
systems do not support private aggregation and lack
scalability for time series data workloads.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) provide an
isolated execution environment without exposing the
data to the server. TEE-based systems have been intro-
duced for analytics and database workloads [5,8,23,46,
54, 60]. However, they require dedicated trusted hard-
ware which may be vulnerable to attacks [15, 20].
9 Conclusion
TimeCrypt is a new system that augments time series
data stores with support for encrypted data processing.
TimeCrypt provides a new set of primitives, notably a
new encryption scheme tailored for stream data that en-
ables fast statistical range queries over large volumes
of encrypted data and empowers data owners to crypto-
graphically restrict the scope of stream queries based on
their privacy preferences and access policies. Our eval-
uation on various large-scale workloads shows that the
overhead of TimeCrypt is close to that of operating on
plaintext data, demonstrating the feasibility of providing
high performance and strong confidentiality guarantees
when operating on large-scale sensitive time series data.
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A Appendix
A.1 TimeCrypt Encryption
In this section, we analyze and proof the security of
TimeCrypt’s cryptographic construction for encrypting
the chunk digest. We first outline the basic crypto-
graphic building blocks of our construction and give a
detailed definition of our encryption scheme. Then, after
analyzing the tree construction of TimeCrypt, we pro-
vide a proof of security of the proposed scheme.
A.1.1 Used Cryptographic Building Blocks
In our construction, we make use of the following cryp-
tographic primitives.
Pseudorandom Function (PRF). A function F :
{0,1}λ ×{0,1}n→{0,1}m is a PRF, if there is no prob-
abilistic polynomial-time (PTT) distinguisher, which
can distinguish Fk(x) = F(k,x) from a random function
drawn from { f : {0,1}n→{0,1}m} with non-negligible
probability in λ where k is drawn uniformly at random
from {0,1}λ [30].
Pseudorandom Generator (PRG). G : {0,1}n →
{0,1}m is a pseudorandom generator, if m > n and no
probabilistic polynomial-time (PTT) distinguisher can
distinguish the output G(x) from a uniform choice r ∈
{0,1}m with non-negligible probability [30].
Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali Construction. The
Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction shows how
to construct a PRF from pseudorandom generators [30].
Given a PRG G : {0,1}s → {0,1}2s and G(x) =
G0(x)||G1(x) both of length s, a PRF F : {0,1}λ ×
{0,1}n→{0,1}s can be constructed as follows.
F(k,x = x1,x2...xn) = Gxn(...(Gx2(Gx1(k)))) (5)
Given G is a pseudorandom generator then the above
construction is a pseudorandom function.
A.1.2 Scheme Definition
TimeCrypt introduces a new variant of the Castelluccia
encryption scheme [18, 19], which in addition to addi-
tive homomorphic computations also allows for access
control. The basic idea of the Castelluccia encryption
scheme is to replace the exclusive-OR operation in a
standard stream cipher with modular addition. We lever-
age the same principle, but extend it with a key deriva-
tion function based on a binary tree (i.e., for access con-
trol) and an encoding for reducing the number of keys
required for decryption on in-range aggregated cipher-
texts. Let TreeKD(k, t) : {0,1}λ ×{0,1}n→{0,1}λ be
our key derivation function with master secret k com-
puting the t-th key, we define our symmetric private-key
encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) as:
• Gen: on input 1λ , randomly pick k ∈ {0,1}λ for the
key derivation function and set the plaintext space to
[0,M−1] where M = 2λ .
• Enc: on input m∈ [0,M−1], samples t ∈ {0,1}n uni-
formly at random and encrypts message m as c :=
〈m+TreeKD(k, t)−TreeKD(k, t+1) mod M, t〉.
• Dec: on input c′, decrypts ciphertext c′= 〈c, t〉 as m=
c−TreeKD(k, t)+TreeKD(k, t+1) mod M.
We observe that the above scheme is additively homo-
morphic if we expand the added ciphertext with the used
parameters t during encryption. Note that for the anal-
ysis, we select the value t uniformly random and attach
it to the ciphertext. However, in our practical system,
we do not attach each parameter t to the ciphertext and
can select t based on the time-counter without compro-
mising the security. As long as the selected values for
t are unique (i.e., do not repeat) the security guarantees
remain intact. Furthermore, we can reduce the number
of key derivations for decryption on in-range aggregated
ciphertexts by canceling out the keys in between.
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To prove the CPA-security of our scheme, we first an-
alyze our key derivation function based on a tree data
structure and show that the function is similar to a pseu-
dorandom function. In a second step, we show that
our encoding in the encryption step, which requires two
evaluations of a pseudorandom function, can be reduced
to a single pseudorandom function. Finally, we proof the
CPA-security on the simplified scheme, which is similar
to the scheme analyzed in [18].
A.1.3 TimeCrypt Tree
In our system, we use a tree-based key derivation func-
tion TreeKD, which allows for access control. We de-
fine the function TreeKD, which derives keys based on
a binary tree with height h. Keys are derived from the
2h leaf-nodes of the tree. Each node in the tree has a
unique label l in {0,1}∗ and an associated tree-key in
{0,1}λ . We define the label of each node in the fol-
lowing manner. The root node of the tree has the label
ε , the empty-string, whereas the left and right children
of a node with label l have the labels l||0 and l||1 re-
spectively. Hence, the leaf nodes ln are indexed by their
label x where x ∈ {0,1}h. We denote a leaf node with
label x as lnx.
Each node in the tree with label l has a tree-key zl
The root-node of the tree has a randomly chosen tree-
key zε in {0,1}λ , which corresponds to the input key
of the key-derivation function. To derive the keys for
the children of a node, a pseudorandom generator G :
{0,1}λ → {0,1}2λ is used. Let G0 and G1 be defined
as G(k) = G0(k)||G1(k), where |G0(k)|= |G1(k)|= |λ |
and k ∈ {0,1}λ . The left and right child of a node with
tree-key zl are computed as zl||0 = G0(zl) and zl||1 =
G1(zl). Hence, the tree-key zl of a leaf-node lnl is con-
structed as follows.
zl = Glh(...(Gl2(Gl1(zε)))) (6)
Note that if a tree-key zl is revealed, it is easy to compute
the tree-keys of its children, but two children tree-keys
do not reveal any information about the parent tree-key.
This property allows for access control.
To derive the key for input value t, the function
TreeKD(k, t) computes the tree-key zt of the leaf-node
lnt with root-node key zε = k and outputs zt . Hence, the
function TreeKD(k, t) : {0,1}λ ×{0,1}h → {0,1}λ is
defined as
TreeKD(k, t) = Gth(...(Gt2(Gt1(k)))) (7)
where t = t1, t2, .., th.
Lemma 1. TreeKD is a pseudorandom function.
Proof. This directly follows from the definition of
the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali construction because
TreeKD has an identical definition.
A.1.4 Proof of Security
Lemma 2. Given any sequence of q distinct n-bit values
x = (x1, ...,xq),y = (y1, ...,yq) where q < 2λ , then there
are at least (2λ )2
λ−q functions f such that F(xi) = yi for
all i, where F = f (x)− f (x+1).
Proof. We use a similar proof construction as pre-
sented in [26]. Let X = {x1, ...,xq} and S = {0,1}λ \X
be the selected sets and S non-empty. We show how to
enumerate all functions f . For all s ∈ S we can set the
function result of f to any λ -bit string independently,
whereas the remaining values x ∈ X can be computed
as f (x) = f (s)+F(s−1)+F(s−2)+ ...+F(x) where
s is the smallest λ -bit string such that s > x. Note that
the addition and the comparison are all modulo 2λ and
s− 1,s− 2, ...,x ∈ X (i.e., s is the smallest λ -bit string,
which is greater than x). With this construction of f , we
can verify that F(xi) = yi for all i since each intermedi-
ate result cancels out. Since |S| = 2λ − q, we first have
2λ − q choices for the argument of the function f and
for each choice 2λ possible results, which accumulates
to total of (2λ )2
λ−q possible functions.
Collary 1. Let O and r be uniform random functions
on {0,1}λ → {0,1}λ and define function R : {0,1}λ →
{0,1}λ as R(t) = r(t)− r(t + 1). For any oracle algo-
rithm A that is bound to 2λ −1 queries to the oracle, the
distribution of the algorithm for O or R as the oracle is
the same.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1, since the
number of queries of A is bound to 2λ −1.
Theorem 1. If function f : {0,1}λ ×{0,1}λ →{0,1}λ
is a pseudorandom function and the corresponding dis-
tinguisher is bound to q ≤ 2λ queries then the func-
tion F : {0,1}λ ×{0,1}λ →{0,1}λ defined as F(k, t) =
f (k, t)− f (k, t+1) mod 2λ is a pseudorandom function
with a distinguisher bound to q/2 queries.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary, which can distin-
guish F from a random function R : {0,1}n → {0,1}λ
with non-negligable probability with q/2 queries to the
oracle. We show with a proof by reduction that given
A, we can construct a polynomial-time distinguisher D
emulating A, which can distinguish the PRF f from a
random function with non-negligible probability. D has
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access to an oracle function O : {0,1}n → {0,1}λ and
emulates A to decide if O is pseudorandom or random
by outputting a bit b ∈ {0,1}. We construct D as fol-
lows.
• Whenever A performs query with value t, D queries
the oracle for O(t), O(t+1) and responds with O(t)−
O(t+1) mod 2λ .
• If A outputs the bit b′, the distinguisher D outputs the
bit b = b′.
If A runs in polynomial time also D runs in polyno-
mial time. We can observe that given attacker A has a
non-negligible advantage in distinguishing F from ran-
dom, the distinguisher D can distinguish f with the same
probability, which follows from Lemma 1 and Collary
1. The intuition is that a distinguisher distinguishing
F from a function U(t) = R(t)−R(r+ 1) mod 2λ has
the same distribution as a distinguisher distinguishing F
from R as long as the distinguisher is bound to 2λ − 1
queries. The distinguisher D requires q queries to the
oracle if A is bounded by q/2 queries. Hence, if A has
an advantage ε , D has an advantage ε in distinguishing
f from r.
With Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we can simplify the
encryption Enc and decryption Dec functions in our
scheme to the following.
• Enc’: on input m ∈ [0,M− 1], samples t ∈ {0,1}n
uniformly at random and encrypts message m as c :=
〈m+F(k, t) mod M, t〉.
• Dec’: on input c′, decrypts ciphertext c′ = 〈c, t〉 as
m = c−F(k, t) mod M.
Theorem 2. If F is a pseudorandom function and n =
λ then the encryption scheme Φ = (Gen,Enc′,Dec′) is
CPA-secure.
To proof the security of this construction, we first
look at a hypothetical encryption scheme, which re-
places the pseudorandom function Fk with a randomly
chosen function R from the same domain. We argue with
a proof by reduction that an attacker has only a negligi-
ble higher success probability in breaking the scheme
with a pseudorandom function Fk compared to a truly
random function R. In a final step, we analyze an at-
tacker for the scheme with a completely random func-
tion R.
Proof. Given scheme Φ = (Gen,Enc′,Dec′) we con-
sider a second scheme Φ˜ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗), which
replaces the pseudorandom function Fk with a random
function R.
• Gen*: on input 1λ , chose a uniform random function
R : {0,1}n → {0,1}λ and set the plaintext space to
[0,M−1] where M = 2λ .
• Enc*: on input m ∈ [0,M− 1], samples t ∈ {0,1}n
uniformly at random and encrypts message m as c :=
〈m+R(t) mod M, t〉.
• Dec*: on input c′, decrypts ciphertext c′ = 〈c, t〉 as
m = c−R(t) mod M.
We first proof that a PPT adversary A has only a neg-
ligible advantage in breaking scheme Φ compared to
Φ˜. We prove this by reduction assuming there exists
a PPT adversary A that has a non-negligible advantage
in the CPA game with scheme Φ in comparison to Φ˜.
With the attacker A, we can construct a distinguisher D,
which distinguishes a pseudorandom random function F
from a random function R with non-negligible probabil-
ity. In the reduction, D has access to an oracle function
O : {0,1}n→{0,1}λ , and determines if this function is
random or pseudorandom by emulating the attacker A.
We construct the distinguisher D as follows:
• Whenever A performs a query to the encryption oracle
with message m ∈ [0,M− 1], D samples r ∈ {0,1}n
uniformly at random, queries Q(r) with response x
and responds to the attacker A with 〈m+x mod M,r〉.
• When A gives two messages m0,m1 ∈ [0,M− 1] as
an output, the distinguisher D choses a bit b ∈ {0,1}
and samples r ∈ {0,1}n uniformly at random, queries
Q(r) with response x and responds with 〈mb+ x mod
M,r〉
• When A outputs the bit b′, the distinguisher D outputs
1 if b′ = b or 0 otherwise.
We can make two observations given the distinguisher
D. If the oracle function O is a pseudorandom func-
tion, the distinguisher D has the same distribution as
the attacker in the CPA experiment with the scheme Φ.
Similarly, if the oracle is a random function, the distin-
guisher D has the same distribution as the attacker in
the CPA experiment with the scheme Φ˜. Hence, given
F is a pseudorandom function, the probability advan-
tage of adversary A in succeeding in the CPA game with
scheme Φ over the scheme Φ˜ is the same success proba-
bility a distinguisher has in distinguishing a pseudoran-
dom function from a random function.
In the second part of the proof, we analyze the scheme
Φ˜ assuming a random function R. In the CPA game,
the attacker A can first query the encryption oracle q(n)
times before the challenge. Assuming the challenge is
computed as 〈m+R(t ′) mod M, t ′〉, where t ′ denotes the
chosen random string, there are two possible outcomes.
In the first case, t ′ never occurred as a choice in the
querying phase. Since R is truly random, A has not
learned anything in the querying phase. As a result, the
probability that A outputs b′ = b during the challenge
is 1/2 because the output R(t ′) is uniformly distributed
and independent. The resulting ciphertext c is the addi-
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tion of R(t ′) and mb modulo M. Since Prob[R(t ′)+m =
c] =Prob[R(t ′) = c−m] =Prob[R(t ′) = r′] and r′ is uni-
formly distributed, we can directly see that the probabil-
ity is 1/2 for distinguishing two encrypted messages.
If the attacker A observes t ′ in the querying phase, the
attacker can determine which message was encrypted.
Due to the observation of the ciphertext c′ = 〈m +
R(t ′) mod M, t ′〉, the attacker learns that m− c′ = R(t ′),
which may be used to distinguish the encrypted mes-
sage. The probability that the attacker observes t ′ is
smaller than q(n)/2n, if t ′ is uniformly drawn from
{0,1}n and the number of queries of the attacker is
bounded by the polynomial function q(n).
By combining the results from both cases and assum-
ing n = λ , we can bound the success probability of the
attacker A in the CPA game with scheme Φ˜ by the prob-
ability 1/2+q(n)/2n.
Using the findings from the first part of the proof, we
can bound the probability of the attacker A in the CPA
game with schemeΦ by the probability 1/2+q(n)/2n+
ε(n), where ε is a negligible function. Because q(n)/2n
is a negligible function and the addition of two negligi-
ble functions is again negligible, we complete the proof.
A.1.5 Discussion
Length-Matching Hash Function. In our proof, we
assume that the plaintext space matches the security pa-
rameter λ (i.e., M = 2λ ). However, if we only want to
encrypt 64-bit integers with 128-bit security, we would
have an overhead in the ciphertext size of 64-bits per ci-
phertext. To match the output of a PRF to the desired
bits of M, one could use a length-matching hash func-
tion, which is also used and analyzed in the Castelluccia
encryption scheme [18]. A length preserving hash func-
tion h : {0,1}λ →{0,1}l must have the property that if t
is uniformly distributed over {0,1}λ then h(t) should be
uniformly distributed over {0,1}l . Note that h is not a
cryptographic hash function (i.e., no collision resistance
is required). One possible construction of h is splitting
the output of the PRF into substrings of the desired range
and exclusive-OR them together [18]. Since h again out-
puts uniformly distributed strings with smaller length,
the security proof only needs a few modifications if h is
applied to each output of the PRF.
Selection of the Key Identifier. Our formal construc-
tion samples the identifier t, which serves as an input
for the PRF, uniformly at random from {0,1}n, to prove
the CPA-security. In our system, t is the identifier for
the key being derived and represents a time counter. As
long as each identifier is only used once in the encryp-
tion process per stream (we keep the state on the client
side), the scheme remains secure. Furthermore, the total
number of keys can be selected according to the upper
bound of chunks to be encrypted for a stream.
A.2 Key Regression
A key regression scheme [28] enables efficient sharing
of past keys. If an entity is in possession of the key re-
gression state si ∈ {0,1}λ , the entity can derive all keys
k j ∈ {0,1}l with j ≤ i for i ∈ {0,1, ...,n}. However, the
entity is not able to infer any information about the keys
kl with l > i. In the following, we describe how to con-
struct a key regression scheme and then define how this
can be used to create the dual-key regression scheme.
Let MSBx(y) denote a function to the x most significant
bits of y and LSBx(y) a function to the x least significant
bits.
A.2.1 Single-Key Regression Construction
Using a pseudorandom generator G : {0,1}λ →
{0,1}λ+l , a client can construct a key regression scheme
as follows. In the first step, the client generates all the
possible states si 0 ≤ i ≤ n in reverse order from an
initially randomly chosen seed sn ∈ {0,1}λ . The seed
si−1 is computed as si−1 = MSBλ (G(si)). To derive
key ki from the corresponding state si, the client com-
putes ki = LSBl(G(si)) (i.e., applies the key derivation
function). For sharing the keys up to the i-th key, the
client shares state si with the other entity. With state
si, the entity can compute all pervious states sx with
0≤ x≤ i by applying the pseudorandom generator func-
tion G. Because of the one-way property of G the client
is not able to compute or infer any information about
s j+1 or any sx with x > j. Since the entity is in pos-
session of states {s0,s1, ...,si}, the entity can derive the
keys {k0,k1, ...,ki} with the key derivation function.
A.2.2 Dual-Key Regression Construction
The key regression scheme based on a single series of
states has the drawback that given the current state si
an entity can compute all the previous states and keys.
Hence, a client is not able to define a lower bound to
restrict access on past keys (e.g., k j, low ≤ j ≤ cur).
To overcome this problem, the idea is to combine two
sequences of states to derive the keys, as introduced in
our prior work [61]. We denote the i-th state of the first
sequence as s1,i and the second sequence as s2,i for i ∈
{0,1, ...,n} where n+1 is the length of each sequence.
In the bootstrapping phase, the client generates the
states s1,i as previously from a randomly chosen seed
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s1,n ∈ {0,1}λ and computes the other states s1,i−1 =
MSBλ (G(s1,i)). To create the possibility for a lower re-
striction level, the second sequence is generated from
the opposite direction. The second sequence starts with
the random seed s2,0 and the corresponding next state is
computed as s2,i+1 = MSBλ (G(s2,i)). To derive the key
k j where j ∈ {0,1, ...,n}, the states s1, j and s2, j serve
as an input to the key derivation function which is de-
fined as k j = LSBl(G(s1, j xor s2, j)). If an entity is in
possession of state s1,i and s2, j where 0 ≤ j < i ≤ n,
the entity can compute the states {s1,0,s1,1...,s1,i−1,s1,i}
and {s2, j,s2, j+1...,s2,n−1,s2,n} with G. Since pairs
of states are required for deriving the keys, the en-
tity can only compute the keys for which it pos-
sesses the corresponding state pairs. Considering the
states computed above, the entity knows the state pairs
{(s1, j,s2, j),(s1, j+1,s2, j+1), ...,(s1,i,s2,i)} and can com-
pute {k j,k j+1, ...,ki} but no other keys. Therefore, the
dual key regression scheme enables access restriction
based on ranges of keys by sharing the corresponding
state of each state sequence.
Note that it is not possible to share two distinct in-
tervals of keys, since all states can be computed in one
direction of each state sequence. To share two distinct
intervals of keys new sequences must be generated.
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